Former Minister of Finance, Samuel D. Tweah, Jr., on Monday, April 20, 2026, took the witness stand in Criminal Court ‘C.’
He delivered a lengthy, but a technical defense that was quickly overshadowed by a series of contradictions and inconsistencies.
On that, prosecutors questioned his credibility before the jury.
Tweah shifted (own) justifications exposed gaps in his testimony.
He is facing charges alongside four former government officials for “illegal authorization of more than L$1 billion and US$500,000 in public funds through the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA).”
Instead of clarifying his role, Tweah’s testimony opened new questions about his decision-making; the legality of his actions, and the accuracy of his own explanations.
He attempted to anchor his authority in two main instruments; the Public Financial Management (PFM) Law and the National Budget.
As he walked the jury through his interpretation of these laws, Tweah’s version of events repeatedly shifted, raising concerns about whether he attempted to redefine ‘standard financial procedures to justify questionable transactions.’
At one point, he told the court that agency requests are not necessary for expenditure, insisting that the mere passage of the national budget gave him full power to spend.
Tweah declared: “The request for resources is the most sufficient trigger for expenditure.”
The conflicting explanations led prosecutors to wonder that he was reconstructing the law to fit his actions, rather than describing the law as written.
One of the most glaring inconsistencies arose when Tweah insisted that emergency -related spending becomes fully legal once the National Security Council (NSC) approves it.
He told the jury: “Once the NSC approves the intervention, the Minister’s authority is complete.”
But the PFM Law is explicit: “any spending that exceeds the budget must be reported to the Legislature under Section 26.”
Tweah never said he reported the FIA-related transfers to lawmakers.
Prosecutors seized on his omission, arguing that NSC approval cannot override statutory reporting requirements, and that Tweah’s failure to mention legislative notification is an admission of procedural breach.
Throughout his testimony, Tweah tried to reassure the jury that the controversial “direct debit” mechanism used to move funds to the FIA was “perfectly lawful.”
He stated: “Direct debit is not outside the budget circle.”
He contradicted himself immediately when he acknowledged: “It is not pre-allotted, but may be allotted subsequently.”
This left courtroom observers questioning, “if something has no pre-allotment, and no documented post-allotment, where exactly does it fall in the budget?”
At that point, prosecution then noticed that Tweah’s explanation confirmed the very point he was attempting to deny that the transfers operated outside the proper budgetary process, at least for a period of time.
When confronted with the absence of written requests or documentation authorizing the FIA transfers, Tweah dismissed these gaps as irrelevant.
He suggested the investigators were too eager to label missing documents as evidence of wrongdoing, comparing it to assuming money is stolen simply because it is no longer visible.
The hearing continues.